Criminal Law -- Sentencing -- Denial of Credit for Time Served or Longer Sentence Imposed at Retrial by McElroy, Pender R.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 46 | Number 2 Article 10
2-1-1968
Criminal Law -- Sentencing -- Denial of Credit for
Time Served or Longer Sentence Imposed at
Retrial
Pender R. McElroy
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation




dent facing an expulsion hearing should be given those procedural
due process rights granted to the college student and to the juvenile.
Both society and the student will benefit if some procedural safe-
guards are granted to the high school suspension hearing rather
than arbitrary procedural laxness.
ERIC MILLS HOLMES
Criminal Law-Sentencing-Denial of Credit for Time
Served or Longer Sentence Imposed at Retrial
In Patton v. North Carolina1 Eddie W. Patton was tried in the
Superior Court of North Carolina for armed robbery in October,
1960. He was unrepresented by counsel and entered a plea of nolo
contendere at the close of the state's evidence. He was convicted,
received a sentence of twenty years and did not appeal. However,
after serving nearly five years in prison, he applied for a state post-
conviction hearing which resulted in a new trial based on the denial
of his constitutional right to counsel at the first trial. Represented
by counsel at the second trial in February, 1965, Patton pleaded not
guilty and was convicted by a jury on the original indictment charg-
ing armed robbery. The trial judge purported to give Patton credit
for the nearly five years served on the original twenty year sentence
and then sentenced him to twenty years imprisonment.
The effect of this sentence is an increased punishment. Had he
not appealed Patton would have been eligible for parole in October,
1965. If he had not been paroled, and without taking earned time
factors into account, he would have completed the first sentence in
October, 1980. As a result of the sentence at the second trial, Pat-
ton will not be eligible for parole until February, 1970, and the
sentence will not terminate until February, 1985. Because he ob-
tained a new trial, Patton will remain in prison five years longer
than if he had not asserted his right to seek a fair trial.
After the second trial, Patton applied to the federal district
court for a writ of habeas corpus. The writ was granted2 and
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
1381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967).
2 Patton v. North Carolina, 256 F. Supp. 225 (W.D.N.C. 1966) ; noted in
1966 DuICE L.J. 1172; 80 HA~v. L. Rlv. 891 (1967); 20 VAND. L. REv.
660 (1967); 12 VIL. L. REv. 380 (1967). See generally Van Alstyne, In
Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties and the "Successf d" Crirninai Appellant,
74 YALE L.J. 606 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne].
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Harsher sentencing imposed upon a successful criminal appellant
at retrial can be accomplished by denying credit for the time served
under the original sentence or by imposing a longer sentence. This
practice is widespread3 and is most often justified upon two grounds.
It has been said that when the conviction at the first trial is over-
turned upon appeal or through other appropriate procedural methods
it is then "void," with the result that the sentence imposed at the
first trial is to be ignored thereafter.4 It is also said that when the
appellant seeks post-conviction relief he waives whatever benefit
he may have enjoyed under the first sentence.5 These theories had
their origin in a different setting. In order to justify the use of
habeas corpus as a tool of review, federal courts granted the writs
"only if the court ordering imprisonment was without jurisdiction-
i.e., if the order was 'void.'"6 Then, to prevent a defendant from
contending that double jeopardy protection barred a retrial, the
courts generally held that the first sentence was void or that the
defendant waived his rights under the previous conviction."
Patton is significant not only for its result, but because it is
'The North Carolina Supreme Court allows longer sentences with credit
or sentences without credit except that the increased sentence when added
to the time appellant has already served may not exceed the maximum
sentence allowed for the offense. State v. Pearce, 268 N.C. 707, 151 S.E.2d
571 (1966); State v. Weaver, 264 N.C. 681, 142 S.E.2d 633 (1965); State
v. White, 262 N.C. 52, 136 S.E.2d 205 (1964), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 1005
(1965); State v. Williams, 261 N.C. 172, 134 S.E.2d 163 (1964); 44 N.C.L.
RFv. 458 (1966). State v. Pearce, supra, was decided after the Patton
decision was rendered in the district court. In refusing to follow that de-
cision, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated, "We adhere to our
former decisions." State v. Pearce, supra at 708, 151 S.E.2d at 572.
'See e.g., United States ex rel. Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d 808 (3d
Cir. 1967); United States v. Harmon, 68 F. 472 (D. Kan. 1895). See
generally Whalen, Resentence Without Credit for Time Served: Unequal
Protection of the Laws, 35 MINN. L. Rav. 239 (1951) [hereinafter cited as
Whalen].
'Whalen 240-44. Van Alstyne 610, suggests two additional rationales
used by other courts:
In other jurisdictions it is said that the appellate court has no authority
to revise a sentence imposed by a trial court within statutory limits,
and that the defendant should look to the executive department for
an exercise of the clemency power. Elsewhere, in rejecting double
jeopardy claims, courts have held with Justice Holmes that a new
trial and sentence is simply a continuation of the same case, and
thus the previous sentence of the defendant does not foreclose inde-
pendent consideration of an appropriate sentence at the second
trial in that case.
'Whalen 242.




the first case at the level of the court of appeals in which the con-
stitutional issues have been fully considered. The court stated
the issue as "whether a defendant may be sentenced to a longer
term of imprisonment at his second trial than he received after his
first conviction, vacated on constitutional grounds."' It found that
a defendant may not be so sentenced and based its decision on three
grounds arising from the United States Constitution.
The first ground grows out of the due process clause.' Had
Patton remained in prison without appealing his unconstitutional
conviction, he could have served out his term to 1980 and could
have been eligible for parole in 1965."0 On the other hand, Patton
could choose to seek his constitutional right to a fair trial by utilizing
appropriate post-conviction remedies. The state tells Patton and
those similarly placed that if he chooses to seek the fair trial, he
does so upon the condition that he give up the right to have the
first sentence remain the same'" and risks a more severe sentence
if convicted at the second trial. The court held that forcing upon the
defendant the risk of harsher punishment as a condition for secur-
ing a constitutional right violates the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. "Enjoyment of a benefit or protection
provided by law," the court said, "cannot be conditioned upon the
'waiver' of a constitutional right."' 2 Although not explicitly spelled
out by the court, it follows by implication that the benefit of a
constitutional right cannot be conditioned upon the waiver of a
8 381 F.2d 636.'In Hill v. Holman, 255 F. Supp. 924 (M.D. Ala. 1966), the court held
that denial of credit for time served in this situation was a denial of due
process. The court said:
The constitutional requirements of due process will not permit the
State of Alabama to require petitioner Hill, or any other prisoner
for that matter, to be penalized by service in the state penitentiary
because of an error made by the state circuit court.
Id. at 925.
"0 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-58 (1964) provides:
All prisoners shall be eligible to have their cases considered for
parole when they have served a fourth of their sentence, if their
sentence is determinate, and a fourth of their minimum sentence, if
their sentence is indeterminate ....
" Under the North Carolina decisions the sentence of a defendant may
not be increased after the term of the trial court has expired and service
of sentence has commenced. State v. Lawrence, 264 N.C. 220, 141 S.E.2d
264 (1965); State v. McLamb, 203 N.C. 442, 166 S.E. 507 (1932); State
v. Warren, 92 N.C. 825 (1885). This rule is followed in all jurisdictions.
Van Alstyne 615.
12 381 F.2d at 640.
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benefit or protection provided by state law, in this case the pro-
tection of not having the sentence lengthened.
1 3
The doctrine of unconstitutional condition is well established"
and its application in this situation should not be startling. As the
court pointed out, the Supreme Court has been concerned in several
cases with restrictions on a convicted defendant's access to post-
conviction relief. 5 In an analogous situation the Fourth Circuit
has held that the trial judge must take into account the time a de-
fendant was incarcerated while awaiting trial."0 In United States v.
WalkerlT the same court considered a case where the defendant had
been sentenced in his absence to three years. He successfully at-
tacked the sentence on the ground of his absence and was resentenced
to five years. It was held that the district court had unintentionally
penalized the defendant for asserting his constitutional right to
seek correction and that a constitutional right cannot be so con-
ditioned.' s
" Van Alstyne 616.
"See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Frost & Frost
Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926). See gewerally 73
HARv. L. Rav. 1595 (1960). In Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad
Comm'n, supra, a state law operated to prevent a private carrier from
enjoying the benefit of state highways unless it submitted to being regulated
as a common carrier by the railroad commission and being subjected to
common carrier liability. Noting that under the due process clause a private
carrier could not be forcibly converted into a common carrier by legisla-
tion, the Court held that the state could not condition use of the state
highways upon the relinquishment of a constitutional right.
" 381 F.2d at 640. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184
(1957); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). In Fay v. Noia, supra,
Noia and two other defendants were convicted of felony murder in 1942.
Noia was sentenced to life imprisonment, his two companions to death.
Noia did not appeal for fear that if he was again convicted he too would
would receive the death penalty. The other two defendants, who did not have
this fear, appealed successfully on the ground that their confessions had been
coerced. They were released in 1955 since the state did not have a case
without the confessions. Noia then decided to appeal, but the state courts
refused relief because his appeal had not been timely. The Supreme Court
held that Noia should have been granted a petition for habeas corpus in
the federal courts because the "grisly choice" which he faced caused him
not to appeal and his choice not to appeal could not "realistically be deemed
a merely tactical or strategic litigation step, or in any way a deliberate
circumvention of state procedures." 372 U.S. at 440.
"Dunn v. United States, 376 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1967). The result in
this case seemed to be based largely on the legislative history behind a
federal statute requiring that such credit be given where the statute defining
the offense requires the imposition of a minimum mandatory sentence.
'346 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1965).
" The court in Walker relied upon Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184
(Vol. 46
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While adopting the district court's holding on due process and
equal protection grounds, the court of appeals extended the lower
court's holding considerably. At the lower court the holding had
been that if a harsher sentence is given at the second trial, there
must be a "discernable" reason and "facts tending to rationally
support the imposition of such a penalty. ... The court of
appeals placed an absolute ban on harsher sentences even if there
was additional testimony introduced at the second trial tending to
support a harsher sentence. In this respect the court followed the
First Circuit in Marano v. United States.2 ° That court said, "The
danger that the government may succeed in obtaining more dam-
aging evidence on a retrial is just as real as the danger, for example,
that the judge on his own may wish to reconsider unfavorably to
the defendant, the factors which led to his original disposition."'"
It also pointed out that imposition of a harsher sentence by the same
judge who felt he had been too lenient the first time or by a different
judge "having a different approach towards sentencing . . . might
well be substantial deterrents to a decision to appeal."'2 2  In sum,
the court said, "A defendant's right of appeal must be unfettered.
3
In placing this absolute ban on harsher resentencing, the court in
Patton drew upon the reasoning of the Supreme Court with respect
to the right to counsel. In Gideon v. Wainwright24 it was recognized
that the lack of counsel created an opportunity for unfairness al-
though in a particular case it may not have prejudiced the defen-
dant's rights. To eliminate this opportunity the presumption of
injury was made conclusive. Therefore in Patton the court held
(1957). In that case Green had been convicted of second degree murder,
had successfully appealed, and upon retrial had been convicted of first degree
murder on the original indictment. The Supreme Court held that Green
could not be tried a second time for first degree murder because such a trial
placed him in double jeopardy. It is significant to note that while placing
its decision on double jeopardy grounds, the Court was greatly concerned
with the fact that the defendant "must be willing to barter his constitutional
protection against a second prosecution for an offense punishable by death
as the price of a successful appeal from an erroneous conviction of another
offense for which he has been sentenced to five to twenty years' imprison-
ment." The Court concluded that the defendant should not be placed "in
such an incredible dilemma." Id. at 193.
"o Patton v. North Carolina, 256 F. Supp. 225, 236 (W.D.N.C. 1966).
20 374 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1967).
21 Id. at 585.
22 Id.
23 Id.
-,372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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that "the new sentence shall not exceed the old." 25 Thus, the court
makes it impossible to punish the defendant for attacking his original
conviction. The possibility that abuses may go undetected is re-
moved, and the doubtful task of determining whether reasons are
discernable or rationally support the imposition of a harsher sen-
tence is eliminated.
The second basis of the Patton decision was the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Since in North Carolina
there can be no increase in a defendant's sentence after the term
of the trial court has expired and the defendant has begun serving
his sentence,26 the threat of a harsher sentence falls only upon one
class of prisoners-those who seek post-conviction relief. Con-
ceding that the state might create a system to review and, if neces-
sary, increase sentences, the court made clear that it cannot arbi-
trarily classify those who are exercising their right to obtain a fair
trial as the only group subject to such an increase. Such "an arbi-
trary classification [is] offensive to the equal protection clause."1
27
2'381 F.2d at 641.
"0 Note 11 supra.
"381 F.2d at 642. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), two
indigent defendants were convicted of armed robbery in state court. In order
to appeal it was required by state law that the appellant furnish the appellate
court a bill of exceptions or report of the proceedings at the trial. The de-
fendants moved in the trial court that such records be provided to them
without cost since they were indigent. The motion was denied. The Su-
preme Court recognized that constitutionally a state is not required to
provide appellate review, but it held that a state providing such review may
not "do so in a way that discriminates against some convicted defendants
on account of their poverty." Id. at 18. In Gray v. Hocker, 268 F. Supp.
1004 (D. Nev. 1967), a state statute required that the time for service of
criminal sentences be computed from the date they were imposed. The effect
of the statute was to preclude the trial judge at a retrial of a successful
criminal appellant from allowing credit for time served under the overturned
sentence. Relying on Griffin v. Illinois, supra, the court held the statute
unconstitutional as applied because it deprived the appellant of equal pro-
tection of the laws. In Gainey v. Turner, 266 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C. 1967)
the court had before it essentially the same fact situation as in Patton. It
held that harsher resentencing violated the due process and equal protection
clauses. In its discussion of equal protection the court found "no rational
basis for distinguishing as a class those who successfully attack [their con-
victions] and those who do not." It found "no legitimate or permissable
[governmental] objective that is served by a state's resentencing practice
that results in a denial of credit for time served in the absence of justifiable
reasons that appear in the record." The court pointed out that the state of
North Carolina had enacted no legislation providing for sentence review
which showed that "the legislature has not considered a review of sentences
of compelling state interest." It finally found that since the classification
was arbitrary and there was no compelling state interest served, "no nexus
between the classification and the objective of government can save the re-
(Vol. 46
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The equal protection ground is relevant to another dimension
of this problem. The proposition that harsher resentencing is pro-
hibited as an unconstitutional condition on the right to a fair trial
would have no application to a defendant whose original trial was
free of constitutional error but had been overturned on some other
ground.2" The equal protection clause, however, does apply in that
situation and would protect that defendant from harsher re-
sentencing.
29
The Patton court utilized still a third ground for its decision
although noting that it was not necessary to do so." It held that
"the constitutional protection against double jeopardy would be
violated if an increased sentence or a denial of credit is permitted
on retrial.""
In order to invoke the double jeopardy protection provided in
the fifth amendment the court had to get over the hurdle of whether
or not that protection is applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment. The problem was solved in a footnote 2 where
the court relied upon United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkens"3
from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In that case it
was pointed out by then Judge Thurgood Marshall that under the
Supreme Court cases "[t]he Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes some limitations on a state's power to re-
prosecute an individual for the same crime."34 The court in Hetenyi
held that the double jeopardy clause is applicable to the states because
the "basic core" of the double jeopardy guarantee is as fundamental
as "those other guarantees of the Bill of Rights already held by the
Supreme Court . . . to be absorbed . . . ,,s3 Although this ap-
sentencing practice in question." The court held that under Quaker City
Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928), these three elements had
to be found for the sentencing practice "to withstand attack under the
Equal Protection Clause." 266 F. Supp. at 101-02. Accord, Patton v. Ross,
267 F. Supp. 387 (E.D.N.C. 1967).
8They were given as fair a trial as the Constitution requires, and
therefore are not required to waive the protection of their original sentence
as a condition of obtaining a constitutionally fair trial. Van Alstyne 615-16.
2 Whaley v. North Carolina, 379 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1967).
3o 381 F.2d at 643.
381 F.2d at 643.
82381 F.2d at 643 n.20.
348 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 913 (1966).
"Id. at 849.
" Id. at 853. The first amendment, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964) ; the fourth amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) ;
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); the self-incrimination clause of the
fifth amendment, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); the right to counsel
1968]
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proach seems to be a reasonable ramification of the selective incor-
poration theory, in the absence of a direct holding by the Supreme
Court to that effect it is not one of the Patton court's stronger points.
As for the double jeopardy holding itself, the court relied pri-
marily on that aspect of double jeopardy which prohibits multiple
punishment for the same offense.3 The court saw "no constitution-
ally significant distinction ' 'sr between prohibiting an increase in a
defendant's sentence once service commenced, and a harsher sen-
tence upon retrial for the same offense following a successful appeal.
Patton had also asserted that he was " 'impliedly acquitted' ,s
of any punishment beyond the twenty years originally received and
therefore placed in double jeopardy when subjected to a harsher
sentence. This argument was based on Green v. United States"
in which the Supreme Court held that where an accused had been
convicted of second-degree murder and had successfully appealed,
he could not then be retried for first degree murder. The theory
there was that by returning a verdict of second-degree murder when
it also could have returned a verdict of first-degree murder, the jury
had impliedly acquitted him of the latter charge. The Patton court
admitted with the defendant, however, "that to maintain that he
was 'acquitted' at the first trial of any penalty greater than twenty
years, is as much a fiction as that he has 'waived' the benefit of his
initial sentence by appealing his conviction.""0
and confrontation clauses of the sixth amendment, Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); the cruel
and unusual punishment prohibition of the eighth amendment, Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
"8Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873). In Lange the pe-
titioner had been convicted of a federal offense for which the punishment
was a fine or imprisonment. Petitioner was sentenced to a term of imprison-
ment and payment of a fine. He was freed on a writ of habeas corpus and
brought before the same judge who had imposed the original sentence for
resentencing. The second time the judge sentenced petitioner only to a
term of imprisonment. The Supreme Court held that he had to be released
altogether because he had paid his fine, the money having passed out of
the legal control of anyone but Congress, and had served five days on the
first sentence. To have required him to serve the second sentence, after
having paid the fine, would have placed him in double jeopardy. The Court
did "not doubt that the Constitution was designed as much to prevent the
criminal from being twice punished for the same offense as from being
twice tried for it." Id. at 173.
"' 381 F2.d at 645. The court also applied this double jeopardy holding
in Whaley v. North Carolina, 379 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1967).
11 381 F.2d at 645.
89355 U.S. 184 (1957).
'0381 F.2d at 645. In Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919),
[Vol. 46
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The Patton decision is welcome and in our enlightened system
of criminal justice could be considered long overdue. It is funda-
mentally unfair for a state to deprive a prisoner of several years
of his freedom on the basis of an erroneous trial for a particular
crime, and then upon a retrial for the same crime refuse to take
those years into account when resentencing him.
Not everyone will be in agreement with the Patton rule, and it
is significant to note the reasons why. In the recent case of Shear
v. Boles41 the federal district court defended vigorously the right of
a trial judge to impose a harsher sentence at a second trial after a
successful appeal. There it was said that a federal habeas corpus
court should exercise "judicial restraint" because of "the fear of
undermining the traditional role of the trial judge."'  The argu-
ment is that the trial judge has "the benefit of presentence reports,
. . . can observe, first hand, the demeanor of the defendant . . .
and is most aware of the actual as well as the extenuating circum-
stances of the defendant's crime."43 These are points well taken in
a defense of the traditional discretion of the trial judge in sentencing.
It should be pointed out that if the defendant did not plead
guilty or nolo contendere at the first trial and received a full trial
the defendant had been convicted of first degree murder and received a life
sentence. That conviction was reversed, he was retried for first degree
murder, and after a second conviction he was sentenced to death. The
Supreme Court upheld the sentence in the face of double jeopardy arguments.
The court in Patton distinguished Stroud in that it appeared "that the case
was argued to the Court on the theory that the defendant was put twice
in jeopardy for the same offense merely by being retried on an indictment
for first degree murder." 381 F.2d at 644. The muliple punishment aspect
of double jeopardy was not considered in Stroud. In People v. Hender-
son, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963), the California
Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy protection of the California
constitution would prohibit a second conviction for the same degree of the
same offense after a successful appeal of the first conviction in which a
non-constitutional error had been committed. The court relied upon the"implied acquittal" rationale of Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
,P 263 F. Supp. 855 (N.D.W.Va. 1967).
42 Id. at 859. In United States ex reL. Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d 808
(3d Cir. 1967), it was said:
It is submitted it would be a flagrant trespass of an independent state
judiciary, to question its discretionary judgment, in the imposition
of a sentence, where the trial judge, in the possession of all the facts
relative thereto, in a proceeding in a Federal court on a writ of habeas
corpus-already ruled on by the highest tribunal of the state-would
vacate the same, unless it clearly flouted constitutional standards of
due process.
Id. at 812.
"8 Shear v. Boles, 263 F. Supp. 855, 859 (N.D.W.Va. 1967).
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with the state introducing as much evidence as it legally may, the
trial judge at that trial had all of the desired information and exer-
cised his discretion as to sentencing to the fullest extent. When the
judge at a retrial revises an original sentence thus imposed, he is
in effect reviewing the original sentence. The equal protection
clause militates against such selective review of the sentences of
only those convicted defendants who appeal.
Further resistance to the Patton rule will come from those who
fear that at the second trial new evidence will appear clearly showing
that the first sentence was inadequate. This evidence generally will
be introduced to bear on the defendant's guilt but will ultimately
induce the judge to impose a harsher sentence; it will be of a nature
showing that defendant's conduct was unusually heinous. Were
harsher resentencing allowed after such new evidence, abuses would
surely result. The prosecution could endeavor to turn up evidence
more damaging to the defendant at the second trial, just as the
same judge might want to change his mind at the second trial."
Theoretically the prosecution will have had a full opportunity at the
first trial to introduce all evidence which might in the end bear on
the sentence. There would seem to be no compelling reason to give
the prosecution a second chance. It is true that there may be in-
stances when it would have been impossible for the new evidence
to have been unearthed for use at the first trial. In such a case the
defendant would unfairly benefit. The considerations supporting
the general application of the rule should outweigh the possibility
that such a case might arise, and there should be no abolition of the
rule just because of this limited situation. There is no reason that
an exception could not be made for this type of situation, assuming
workable standards could be laid down.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, while prohibiting
harsher resentencing as a general proposition, would allow it based
on events occurring subsequent to the first trial and contained in a
presentence report.45  Defendants who do not appeal do not have
their sentences increased because of their bad behavior, however;
thus, it is a denial of equal protection to increase the sentences of
those who do appeal. The state has adequate means to allow for
bad behavior subsequent to trial, e.g., denial of parole.
The court in Shear points out that where a defendant pleads




guilty following arrest, thus avoiding the necessity for a trial, "the
first sentencing judge may not have had a meaningful opportunity
to weigh . . . the defendant's . . . character and to consider the
other important, intangible factors which play a vital role in the
determination of a sentence."4  When the defendant pleads not
guilty at the second trial, presumably the judge at that trial is
afforded such an opportunity. Many convicted defendants have
pleaded guilty after arrest and are serving the sentences received
without appealing. No judge will ever have an opportunity to
weigh the character of those defendants or to consider other intan-
gible factors and adjust their sentence accordingly. It is only by
denying an equal measure of protection to an appealing defendant
that his sentence can be lengthened.
In United States ex rel. Starner v. Russell"' the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, in justifying harsher sentences at retrial,
noted that federal and state courts generally follow the practice of
extending leniency when the defendant pleads guilty and do not do
so when the defendant chooses to go to trial.48 The implication
apparently is that leniency at the first trial justifies the harsher sen-
tence at the second trial. This practice is a clear illustration of pen-
alizing the defendant merely for seeking a full and fair trial.
It could be argued that the result in Patton will lead to the impo-
sition of a harsher sentence in the first trial so that if the defendant
appeals and gets a new trial the second trial judge will not be re-
stricted to a sentence that might seem to him to be inadequate. This
practice would seem to be highly unlikely in view of the gross un-
fairness to all defendants so sentenced and of the many other fac-
tors that influence the trial judge in imposing sentences.
It should be asked whether the Patton decision might be appli-
cable to other situations. Suppose a driver, after having been
stopped on the highway by a law enforcement officer for exceeding
the speed limit, is asked to open his trunk to let the officer examine
its contents. If the driver complies with the request he may not
receive a traffic ticket but only a warning. If he refuses, he is sure
to receive the ticket. The driver complies and in his trunk is found
incriminating evidence that leads to his conviction for a crime
completely unrelated to the speeding. Has the driver "waived"
" Shear v. Boles, 263 F. Supp. 855, 860 (N.D.W.Va. 1967).
" 378 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1967).
8Id. at 812.
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his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, or is
the waiver one that is forced and not of free choice as is the pur-
ported waiver of the defendant who decides to appeal his convic-
tion?
Suppose a person is arrested and charged with a crime. The
officials offer the accused and his attorney the following proposition:
if the accused will plead guilty to a lesser charge the state will re-
ciprocate by recommending leniency and by other rewards usually
offered where guilty-plea bargaining is carried on. The accused and
his attorney, after weighing the chances of conviction and of re-
ceiving a heavier sentence if there is a not guilty plea, decide to
accept the offer. 9 Is this situation essentially different from the
situation of the convicted defendant who weighs his chances of
a heavier sentence and decides not to appeal?50
Suppose a state statute provides that a defendant indicted for
first degree murder may plead guilty, with the consent of the court
and the district attorney, and in that event he may only be sen-
tenced to life imprisonment if convicted.5' Such a statute would
mean that if the defendant pleads not guilty, there would be a trial
at which he might receive the death penalty. Can the state constitu-
tionally allow the defendant to exercise his right to a jury trial only
at the peril of receiving the death penalty?
Finally, suppose a defendant is convicted of a crime in a court of
limited jurisdiction within the state such as a city court. A fine is
imposed along with court costs. He then appeals to a court of
general jurisdiction such as the state superior court for a trial de
novo. He is again convicted, but a heavier fine is imposed and
the defendant has to pay the higher court costs. Is this such a
restriction on the right to appeal as would be prohibited by the
Patton court?
PENDER R. MCELROY
"'A similar situation is posed in L. HALL & Y. KAMISAR, MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 505 (1966)."0 It should be pointed out that guilty-plea bargaining is an entirely ac-
ceptable and presently necessary function. Further, the choice of the de-
fendant is admittedly more freely made than the choice in the Patton
situation.
"1N.Y. PEN. LAw §§ 1045(2), 1045a (McKinney, Supp. 1966). This
statute is presently being challenged on the ground that it conditions the
exercise of the right to a hearing upon the risk of death. Brief for Petition-
er-Appellant at 14-16, Moore v. State, pending in the Supreme Court of New
York, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
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